讲座题目：Imperfect Competition and Rents in Labor and Product Markets: The Case of the Construction Industry

摘要：We quantify the importance of imperfect competition in the US construction industry by estimating the size of rents earned by American firms and workers. To obtain a comprehensive measure of the total rents and to understand its sources, we take into account that rents may arise due to markdown of wages in the labor market, or markup of prices in the product market, or both. Our analyses combine the universe of US business and worker tax records with newly collected records from US procurement auctions. We use this data to identify and estimate a model where construction firms compete with one another for projects in the product market and for workers in the labor market. The firms may participate both in the private market and in government projects procured through auctions. We find evidence of considerable wage- and price-setting power. This imperfect competition creates sizable rents, three-fourths of which is captured by the firms. The incentives of firms to mark down wages and reduce employment due to wage-setting power are attenuated by their price-setting power in the product market.

主讲人：罗耀 副教授（加拿大多伦多大学）

讲座时间：2023年3月22日（周三）9:30—11:00

讲座方式：线上腾讯会议ID：372871355

讲座语言：中英文

主持人：邹先强 讲师

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报名链接:https://www.wjx.top/vm/YttOAlJ.aspx

主讲人简介：

罗耀，加拿大多伦多大学经济系副教授，宾州州立大学经济学博士。主要从事产业组织和应用计量领域的研究。研究获得SSHRC、NET Institute 等的资助，项目涵盖非线性定价、实证拍卖和生产函数估计等，主要用于分析中国电信市场、政府招投标、拍卖、钢铁行业以及金融等。成果发表在Journal of Political Economy、RAND Journal of Economics、Review of Economics and Statistics、International Economic Review 等学术期刊。